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RESUMEN: 
 
El primer intento de lograr un acuerdo entre la Unión Europea y Mercosur acabó sin 
éxito en Octubre 2004. En 2010 la UE lo intentó otra vez. Sin embargo este segundo intento 
conllevaba problemas y retos nuevos, entre aquellos: la actual crisis global, el ingreso de 
diez nuevos Estados miembros, las restricciones que Argentina puso a las exportaciones de 
la UE, la falta de desarrollo del proprio Mercosur   en una area político y económicamente 
integrada. En este artículo se sostiene que el acuerdo de asociación puede más bien 
explicarse como resultado del particular interés que llevan España y Portugal, y el utilizo 
entre los demás instrumentos, del “momentum” creado por la presidencia Española de la 
UE. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The first attempt to secure an association agreement between the European Union 
(EU) and the Mercosur ended unsuccessfully in October 2004. In 2010, the EU launched a 
second attempt to reach an association agreement with Mercosur. This second attempt to 
secure an association agreement presented new obstacles, including: the current economic 
crisis; the accession of ten new member state countries; the restrictions Argentina has 
imposed on EU exports; the lack of progress made in terms of developing Mercosur into an 
integrated political-economic.This paper argues that the association agreement can more 
accurately be explained as being the result of Spain and Portugal particular interest, and the 
use of among other actions the “momentum” created by the Spanish presidency of the EU.  
 
Key words: EU, Mercosur, Association Agreement, Europeanization, Spanish Presidency, 
Trade Negotiations 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The development of the European Union relations with Mercosur has traditionally 
included different areas such as trade, cooperation development and political dialogue under 
the Europe-Mercosur Inter-regional Framework Cooperation Agreement (EMIFCA) which 
was established in 1995. However, attempts to establish an inter-regional agreement have 
been hindered by the notoriously polemical nature of debates around agricultural issues both 
inside the EU and between the member states of the Mercosur. As such, the fraught nature of 
these debates resulted in the failure to secure an association agreement in 2004. Six years 
later both the EU and the Mercosur sought to re-launch negotiations. However, the same 
problems persisted. In fact, it could be argued that given the importance of the agricultural 
sector to the new EU member states made these problems more acute.  
  
This paper critically examines some of the reasons given for the development of the 
first attempt to secure an inter-regional association agreement between two regions in the 
world, before the Central America signed an association agreement with the European Union 
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in 2010. The discussion below also identifies and explains gaps in previous attempts to 
explain the first set of negotiations between 1999 and 2004 and will also consider whether 
these arguments can also be used to explain the second attempt to negotiate an association 
agreement from 2009 to the present. In response to the limitations of these arguments, it will 
be suggested that a conceptual framework which considers the significance of the 
Europeanization of Spanish and Portuguese foreign policy, especially Spanish foreign policy, 
towards Mercosur provides a more satisfactory framework to explain attempts to secure an 
associational agreement between both regions. However, necessary as the political pressure 
created by the Europeanization of the Iberian countries foreign policy was, the discussion 
below will emphasize that such negotiations could not have taken place without the enormous 
interest shown and proactive attempts made by the Mercosur in developing relations with the 
EU. The proactive role of Mercosur fits with the argument of JorgMonar2 (1997) which 
identifies third parties as more interested in developing relations with the EU than the EU 
itself.  
 
 
1. REVIEW OF EXPLANATIONS FOR THE FIRST SET OF NEGOTIATIONS. 
 
The existing literature on EU-Mercosur relations tries to explain the first attempt to 
reach an association agreement. Most of the work on EU-Mercosur relationsunfortunately is 
descriptive. The way that the literature has developed in terms of analysing EU-Mercosur 
relations (i.e. by focusing on specific successful or unsuccessful key moments) fails to 
critically examine the lack of progress towards an association agreement. Another noticeable 
limitation in the existing academic work is use of a short-term temporal framework which 
places emphasis on studying EU-Mercosur relations around the time of the 2004 
negotiations). More specifically, this results in a lack of long-term analysis and the failure to 
engage with discussions of those explanations which examine other periods of EU-Mercosur 
relations. Two of the reasons given in the literature, “affinity”3and “EU global 
aspirations”4are too loose and superficial to discuss them in a journal article.  
                                                          
2Monar, J. (1997) “Political Dialogue with Third Countries and regional Political Groupings: The Fifteen as an 
Attractive Interlocutor” in Foreign Policy of the European Union From EPC to CFSP and Beyond (eds) 
Regelsberger, de Schoutheete, and Wessels London: Lynne Rienner. 
3Forexample, seeAldecoa Luzarraga, F. (1995) “El acuerdo entre la Union Europea y el Mercosur en el marco 
de la intensificación de relaciones entre Europa y America Latina. Revista de InstitucionesEuropeas, Vol. 22, N 
3 pp761-792; Sanahuja, J. A. (2000a) “Trade, Politics, and Democratization: The 1997 Global  Agreement 
between the European Union and Mexico.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2, 
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The most common argument that can be found in the existing literature focuses on 
competition between the EU and the US to become Latin America‟s main trading partner. 
Here it is suggested that the EU has sought to counterbalance the power and strong levels of 
influence that the US exerts in the region5. This literature tends to focus on the first stage of 
the policy negotiations which took place from mid-1990‟s onwards.The influence of the US 
in the entire region has been important throughout the course of the twentieth century. So 
much so, that Latin America has been considered the US‟ „backyard‟. For normative and 
economic reasons, proponents of this argument suggest that, the EU was trying to achieve the 
same degree of influence in the region.  
 
In relation to economic issues, this argument is said to be evidenced by the supposed 
reaction of the EU to the US-led Free Trade Area of Americas project. In an attempt to exert 
greater influence in the region, it is suggested that both the US and the EU would compete 
over Latin America trough improving trade conditions with the region6.Holland7(2002) 
argues that trade is of potential benefit to European companies. However, this explanation 
fails to adequately explain both the first and second attempts to reach an association 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Special Issue: The European Union and Latin America: Changing Relations; Freres, C. (2000) “The European 
Union as a Global “Civilian Power”: Development Cooperation in EU-Latin American Relations” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol, 42, No. 2; Freres, C. & , Sanahuja J.A. (2005) “Final Report 
Study on Relations between the European Union and Latin America” New strategies and Perspectives 
InstitutoComplutense de EstudiosInternacionales: Madrid.  
4Forexample, seeLaporteGalli, D. (1996) “La Unión Europea y el Cono Sur emprenden la reocnciliacion” 
FundacioCidob; Galinsoga, J. (1995) “Balance del proceso de San Jose: logros y carencias”. Ponencia 
presentata en el Seminario: Perspectivas del proceso de San Jose. San Jose de Costa Rica, 29, 30 y 31 de mayo 
de 1995. Organizado por el Instituto de Relaciones Europe-LatinoAmericanas(IRELA), Madrid.; Smith, K. 
(2003) EuropeanForeignPolicy in a ChangingWorld, Cambridge PolityPress; Freres 2000; Santander S. (2005) 
“TheEuropeanPartnershipwith Mercosur: A RelationshipBasedonStrategic and Neo-Liberal Principles”, 
EuropeanIntegration, 27(3), pp. 285-306. 
5Smith, H. (1999) “Actually existing foreign policy or not? The EU in Latin and Central America” in Decision-
making in the European Union (eds.) Bomberg and Peterson, Palgrave MacMillan: London; Bulmer Thomas 
(2000) “The European Union and MERCOSUR: Prospects for the Free Trade Agreement and Implications for 
the United States”, Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs (Spring 2000) ; Crawley, A. (2000) 
“Towards a Biregional Agenda for the Twenty-first century”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World 
Affairs 42, no. 2 pp 9-34; Holland, M. (2002) The European Union and the Third World. Hampshire: Palgrave; 
Giordano, P. (2002) “The external dimension of the Mercosur: Prospects for North-South integration with the 
European Union”, Royal Institute for International Affairs Mercosur study groups London May 23; Santander S. 
(2002) “EU-Mercosur Interregionalism: Facing Up to the South American Crisis and the Emerging Free Trade 
Area of the Americas”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 7, pp. 491-505. 
Santander 2005; Smith 2003:80; Torelli 2003. 
6E.g. Sanahuja, J. A. (2000b) “Asimetrías económicas y concertación política en las relaciones Unión Europea-
America Latina: un examen de los problemas comerciales” Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales; 
Arenas 2002; Alecu de Flers, N. &Regelsberger, E. (2005) “The EU and inter-regional cooperation” in Hill C, 
Smith M (eds)Internationalrelations and theEuropeanunion. OUP, Oxford, pp 317–342. 
7 See Holland 2002 
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agreement. Each of these cases tends to emphasise the economic importance of relations with 
the EU, particularly the extent to which trade between both regions is important for Latin 
America. However, they fail to highlight the little importance of international trade for the 
EU in relative terms
8
. This is particularly important in terms of understanding the extent to 
which the EU has real economic interest in this region. In fact, the % of EU trade with Latin 
America is no more than 2% in relative terms (of all EU trade). This perspective is even more 
problematic when it comes to explaining the second attempt to secure an association 
agreement, primarily because the expansion of the EU to twenty-seven countries has 
increased internal trade, especially in the vitally important agricultural sector.Furthermore, 
there are two contradictory arguments in the existing literature. On the one hand, it is 
suggested that the FTA would discourage European Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)9, 
whilst, on the other hand, it is argued that the FTA would encourage European FDI10. 
Faust11 concludes that “the empirical evidence demonstrates that there is no single variable 
with sufficient explanatory power to clarify the course of EU-Mercosur trade relation”. 
Finally, the US has had for over a century a strong hegemonic position in the American 
continent, with only new trends in economic and political relations between China and Latin 
America suggesting that only China has the potential to rival the US in terms of levels of 
foreign direct investment in Latin America. 
 
The notion that there is also agrowing political competitiveness between the EU and 
the US is advanced by Grugel12, who argues that: “New regionalism thus offers the EU a 
chance of reaffirming its role as a global actor; in creating a relationship with Mercosur, the 
EU also remakes itself. In comparison to the US, Grugel also suggests that the EU has a very 
specific way of dealing with Mercosur which is more in line with the EU‟s project on 
regional integration. A similar argument is put forward by Cienfuegos13 who argues that the 
                                                          
8
Cienfuegos (2006:275) does mention the increase in % of imports from Mercosur in relative terms to the EU in 
the case of an agreement between the EU and Mercosur but it does not mention the actual volume of that level 
of trade. More importantly, it ignores the lack of importance of such as small %; between +0,023% and 
+0,027% of all the EU imports.  
9Robles, A C.  (2008) “The EU and Asean: Learning from the failed EU-Mercosur FTA” ASEAN Economic 
Bulletin Negotiations Volume 25, Number 3.  
10 Cienfuegos, M. (2006) “La asociación estratégica entre la unión europea y el Mercosur, en la encrucijada” 
Noviembre Barcelona: CIDOB. 
11Faust 2004:20 “The European Union‟s Trade Policy towards Mercosur” in Aggarwal, Vinod/Fogerty, Ed 
(eds.): Between Regionalism and Global ism: Interregional Trade Strategies of the EU, London, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
12Grugel, J. (2004:622). “New regionalism and Modes of Governance-Comparing US and the EU Strategies in 
Latin America” European Journal of International Relations 2004, Vol. 10 (4):603-626 
13 See Cienfuegos (2006:81). 
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EU is “attempting to establish new and deeper regional relationships in order to cope with 
and mitigate the impact of US power”. This explanation fails to offer an in-depth analysis of 
how the EU would be capable of competing with the US in general terms and more 
importantly, in an area traditionally considered to be the US‟s “backyard” during both 
attempts to create an association agreement. To say the least, it is an exaggeration to argue 
that the EU was both willing and capable of competing with the US over a region thathas 
traditionally ignored. Over the years there have been plenty of complaints of actually the 
opposite: that the EU has shown a distinct lack of interest in the region. At the time of the 
first series of negotiations, the EU‟s interest in Central and Eastern European countries 
dominated most aspects of EU foreign policy. During the second round of negotiations, the 
EU is more concerned with foreign policy towards the Middle East region, especially in 
relation to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the spring revolutions in the Arab world for obvious 
security reasons.  
   
In contrast to the “counterbalancing”, it has also been suggested that the EU‟s role as 
External Federator in Latin America and Mercosur in particular, explains the development of 
the EU‟s policy agenda towards Latin America14. Andy Klom15 who was, at that time, Desk 
Officer for Mercosur at the External Relations Directorate-General of the European 
Commission in Brussels, confirms how important the EU model of integration was in terms 
of how Mercosur was constructed.However, much of this work is largely descriptive and fails 
to offer a satisfactory analysis of what the EU was actually trying to achieve by promoting 
regionalism (i.e. EU civilian power)16. In other words, Latin America may in fact choose to 
imitate the EU as a model of regional integration. However, this does not mean that it is the 
EU who is pushing Latin America/ Mercosur to follow the EU model.  
 
                                                          
14E.g. Hoste, A. (1999) “The new Latin American Policy of the EU” University of Bradford DSA European 
development Policy Study Group Discussion Paper No. 11, February; Sanchez Bajo, C. (1999) “The European 
Union and Mercosur: a case of inter-regionalism” Third World QuarterlyVol 20, No 5 pp 927-941; Klom, A. 
(2000) “Association negotiations between the Mercosur and the European Union: Rivalling Western 
Hemisphere integration or supporting Southern Cone integration?” Dollars, Democracy and Trade: External 
Influence on Economic Integration in the Americas Los Angeles, May 18 2000 The Pacific Council on 
International Policy, Los Angeles. See Kanner 2002;See Grugel 2004; Carranza, M.E. (2004) “Mercosur and 
the end game of the FTAA negotiations: challenges and prospects after the Argentine crisis”, Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 319–337; Botto, M. (2007) “The Role of Epistemic Communities in the 
makeability of MERCOSUR” The makeability of regions GARNET 2007. 
15 See Klom. 
16 See Hoste 1999 and Kanner 2002 
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This argument has a considerable amount of explanatory power for both attempts 
since it is clear that the EU promotes regionalism. The real issue is how far is the EU willing 
to go to promote regionalism. In this instance, it seems that when it comes to Mercosur, the 
EU clearly sent Mercosur a mixed message when they offered a political partnership to Brazil 
in 200817. More specifically, the damaging effect of this partnership for Mercosur‟s internal 
relations, in particular the fraught relationship between the long-term rivals Argentina and 
Brazil, should not be underestimated. By offering a special channel of communication to the 
biggest country, not just in Mercosur, but in Latin America, enhanced Brazil‟s considerable 
power in its own region, as well as in the European Parliament, where there were 
disagreements about the suitability of this partnership18. In the second attempt to reach an 
association agreement, Brazil‟s importance in the world has only increased and the 
partnership with the EU is very much active. This questions any argument of the EU 
prioritizing regionalism over other interests. That is to say, the EU welcomes regionalism but 
it does not mean that it is the EU‟s priority.  
 
  
2. EUROPEANIZATION OF SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE FOREIGN 
POLICY: NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT. 
 
Spanish presidencies, commissioners, MEPs and representatives in Coreper provided 
the necessary “momentum” and channelled these demands during both the first and the 
second attempts to secure a regional agreement. This was part of a clear Spanish strategy to 
achieve the Europeanization of its foreign policy towards Mercosur. I argue that the attempt 
to Europeanize Spanish, and to some extent Portuguese, foreign policy is vital in terms of 
explaining both the first and second attempts to establish an association agreement.  
 
Historical institutionalism and Europeanization 
The concept of “history matters” is the starting point of historical institutional 
approaches emphasising the importance of the Europeanization of national foreign policies. 
In terms of historical institutional approaches, it is argued that a decision taken at a particular 
moment of history, by an institution, can be a factor that can determine the future of the 
protagonists of those events. In other words, in relation to the way that an institution has been 
                                                          
17Interview 1: Official from DG External Relations 
18 Ibid. 
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created, initial decisions will affect the future. By transporting the idea that “History matters” 
into the framework of historical institutionalism, the concept is used to follow the idea that 
historical events can produce institutional change. In order to chart the evolution of certain 
events within institutions, this approach starts from an explanation of the historical event. 
Here it is argued that the historical event will create a path that will be followed and as a 
consequence this will create a dependency on the path because there is not a second “lane” to 
follow or plan “B”. Pierson19 explains that “path dependence refers to the causal relevance 
of preceding stages in a temporal sequence”. Pierson also draws upon Sewell‟s20 definition 
of path dependence which suggests that “(Path dependence means) that what happened at an 
earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a 
later point in time”. 
 
The link between historical institutionalism and the concept of Europeanization is 
based on the idea that Europeanization, broadly speaking, is related to the influence of or 
influence in EU institutions. As a consequence of this “influence” EU institutions up-load a 
national idea/policy and “institutionalize” the idea/policy to the point that it is taken up by 
other EU member states. Nevertheless, whether it is through a process of downloading or 
uploading, EU institutions provide the framework in which a policy is developed. In other 
words, EU institutions “matter” in terms of the way this policy is taken up or downloaded. 
EU institutions are also the independent variable during the development of a policy. More 
specifically, understanding the nature of EU institutions helps to explain why the policy is 
created and the way that it is either downloaded at the national level or uploaded at the EU 
level. And finally, EU institutions matter in terms of historical context, particularly the way 
that it takes a historical event to initiate a policy or a process of path dependency. However, 
the historical event does not need to be something unusual or totally unexpected but rather a 
critical juncture, where the success of a policy is determined by being in the right place at the 
right time. In other words, if the policy emerges at a different time and place; the nature of 
the policy will be quite different.  Spain and Portugal joined the EU at the same time that 
Mercosur started to develop as a regional group could be the critical juncture. The power 
division among EU institutions influenced sharply the type of agreement and the limitations 
of it.  
                                                          
19 (2000:2) Pierson “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, The American Political 
Science Review 94 (2) pp 251-267. 
20 Sewell W.H. 1996:262-263 “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology”. In the Historic Turn in 
the Human Sciences, ed. Terrance J. McDonald. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press pp.245-80. 
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Europeanization is certainly not a new concept, it has been used in many studies. 
However, very few scholars have tried to provide an exact definition of Europeanization21. 
In the area of foreign policy, Wong22 argues that the notion of there being a Europeanization 
of foreign policy was initiated by Ben Tonra23. Therefore, the definition of Europeanization 
will echo this definition used in the area of foreign policy. Tonra‟s24defines Europeanization: 
„A transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways 
in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internationalisation 
of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy 
making.  
 
A key question in the study of European foreign policy relates to the concept of 
“movement”. The concept of Europeanization itself is about movement, particularly when 
speaking of “transformation”. When examining the issue of “transformation”, it is important 
to ask what is actually transforming. In other words, “what is changing and what are the 
mechanisms and direction of change (top-down from the EU to the member states, bottom-
up, or socialization?)”25. In relation to “what is changing”, the discussion is about the 
changing of either procedures or the substance of the foreign policies of individual members 
states26. In line with the discussion above, this relates to the idea of a member state trying to 
influence the EU foreign policy in a particular area and, as a result, the EU up-loading the 
policy.  
 
According to Reuben Wong27, there are three aspects of Europeanization, but only 
one focuses on “national projection” which can be defined as the: “national foreign policy of 
a member state affects and contributes to the development of a common European [foreign 
policy](„Uploading‟)”28. Wong29also outlines the different indicators of this aspect within 
the national foreign policy: 1) “A State attempts to increase national influence in the world”; 
                                                          
21 Featherstone, K. &Radaelli, C. (2003) The Politics of Europeanization Oxford: Oxford University Press 
22 Wong, R.  (2008) “Foreign Policy” in Graziano, P. and P. Vink, M.P. (eds) Europeanization New Research 
Agendas Palgrave Macmillian New York. 
23Tonra, B. (2001), The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish andIrish Foreign Policy in 
the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
24 See Wong 2008: 323 quotes from Tonra 2000: 229. 
25 See Wong 2008:323. 
26 See Wong 2008. 
27 See Wong 2008:326. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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2) “A State attempts to influence foreign policies of other member states”; 3) “A State uses 
the EU as a cover/umbrella”; and 4) “Externalization of national [foreign policy] positions 
onto the EU level” The second and fourth indicators are of particular relevance to this paper. 
Spain and, to a lesser extent, Portugal tried to “upload” their interest in Mercosur to the EU 
level. In addition to this, the country initiating the policy (i.e. Spain and Portugal) were able 
to influence other EU countries, especially those countries that had not yet formed a coherent 
or strong policy towards Mercosur. In general terms, and not just in relation to Mercosur, 
Dykmann30 suggests that “It is evident that the peninsular authorities and their 
representatives are very present in institutions concerned with European policy towards Latin 
America”. 
  
During the first set of negotiations between 1999 and 2004, Spain tried to help with 
the negotiations in several different ways. Until 1992, Spanish interests were fundamentally 
represented by the Spanish Commissioner, Abel Matutes. The following year, Manuel Marin 
took over the role. Marin played an extensive role in helping to create the arrangements that 
would lead to launch of the negotiations of the agreement. On the 19
th
 of October 1994, 
Marin presented the European Commission‟s proposed “enhanced policy” towards 
Mercosur31 to the media. In this policy, the Commission offered two potential scenarios for 
the run-up to 200032. Marin favoured the most ambition one for Mercosur which included a 
trade agreement. The Commission was already considering the presentation of draft 
negotiating directives to the Council of Ministers in early 199533which was adopted by the 
General Affairs Council in June that year34. On the 15
th
 of December 1995, the Interregional 
Framework Agreement between the European Community, the EU Member States and 
Mercosur and the member states of Mercosur was signed in Madrid. AldecoaLuzarraga35 
emphasises just how important it was that Spain held the Presidency of the EU in 1995, in 
terms of improving relations between the EU and Mercosur. 
  
                                                          
30Dykmann, K. 2006: 92-93 (2006) The European Union Foreign Policy and the Southern 
ConeVervuertVerlag  Frankfurt am Main. 
31European Commission (1994a) “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament “The European Community and Mercosur-An enhanced policy” (COM (94) 428. European 
Commission External relations Directorate Latin America Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006. 
32 Ibid. 
33 European Commission (1994c) Mercosur Foreign Ministers visit commission Press release IP/94/1091. 24
th
 
November 1994. 
34European Commission (1994b) “Commission Press Release report on the implementation of macro-financial 
assistance to third countries” Press release IP/94/529. 14th June 1994. 
35See Aldecoa Luzarraga 1995. 
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Once the agreement was signed, again the Spanish political apparatus tried a variety 
of different ways to launch the negotiations which finally took place in 1999. The pressure of 
going empty handed to the first Summit of the head of States of the EU and Latin America 
also put pressure on EU countries them. The lack of a negotiating mandate from the Council 
stalled the beginning of the negotiations. The Summit in Cologne weeks before the summit in 
Latin America did resolve these issues and French President Jacques Chirac vetoed the 
German proposal of splitting the dates for starting the negotiations36. Few hoped that these 
issues would be resolved by the start of a meeting which would take place just four days 
before the Rio Summit with the Heads of States of the EU and Latin America. An agreement 
was finally reached on the 21
st
 of June 1999. In the days leading up to the 21
st
 of June, Spain 
tried to encourage France towards a possible agreement37. The fact that France eventually 
accepted an offer that was worse than the one offered to them during the Cologne summit in 
Germany suggests that the pressure being exerted on France appears to have had an impact. 
In addition to the pressure being mounted by the European Commission and Spain, it also 
seems that the pressure exerted on French Embassies in Latin America also had some 
influence38. During the Spanish presidency of 2002, the negotiations progressed as a result 
of the Spanish diplomatic team and a successful end was expected during the Portuguese 
presidency of 2004. Although at the last minute, Argentina decided not to accept the EU‟s 
offer. 
  
During the second round of negotiations, Spain again used their presidency of the 
European Union to try to create level of interests and political momentum required to 
establish a regional agreement with Mercosur. A month before the Spanish presidency 
started, Spain and Portugal demonstrated their commitment to the negotiations in the 
presence of Mercosur countries39. For example, in November of 2009, there was a meeting 
in Madrid where this issue was specifically discussed by Juan Pablo de Laiglesia, Secretary 
of state for Iberoamerica of the Spanish Government40. In fact, it was planned to encourage 
the negotiations in the following Iberoamerica summit that would be held a month later41. 
                                                          
36El País 6/6/1999 “Chirac dinamito la negociación con Mercosur en la cumbre de la UE”. 
37Agence Europe 21/6/1999 “Franco-Spanish compromise allows negotiating brief with Mercosur and Chile to 
be brought out of deadlock”. 
38El País 22/6/1999 “La Unión Europea vence la Resistencia francesa para abrir negociaciones con Mercosur 
en el 2001”. 
39SeeAgenceEurope 5/12/2009. 
40El Pais 25/11/2009 “España impulsa el pacto comercial de la UE con Mercosur”. 
41Ibid. 
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The importance of the Spanish presidency in progressing the negotiations with 
Mercosur was even expressed by the Director of the European Commission in the Area of 
Latin America42. An MEP even claimed that: “if with the Spanish presidency there is not 
progress with Latin America, forget about it”43. The Sub-Secretariat of Economic Integration 
in Mercosur Eduardo Sigal also suggested that the Spanish presidency and the role of Spain is 
one of the key causes to improve the relations44. Moreover, the Spanish Vice-President at 
that time went to Buenos Aires to discuss the issue with the president of Argentina and 
declared that: “This is a very important occasion, that it is not going to be repeated in a long 
time, Spain will preside the EU and Argentina, Mercosur, and we both can influence in the 
priorities and in the agendas of the organizations”45. In summary, because Spain knew that 
future presidents of the EU would ignore Latin America, Spain put forward the case for any 
negotiations and agreements talks between the EU and Latin America46. Spain also tried to 
initiate and to conclude negotiations with Mercosur during the six months that lasted the 
presidency. However, it was clear that many doubted the possibility of achieving that result 
that soon. According to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moratinos: “We will 
continue the ambitious negotiations but will it be possible to conclude talks by May? It is 
difficult to say but we will do all we can to achieve this in Madrid”47. 
  
Obstacles and support for Europeanization 
Agricultural issues within the EU created many obstacles during the first round of 
negotiations: “The majority of the ministers of industry, economic and foreign affairs from 
the EU member states appeared to support the negotiations with Mercosur. But the French, 
Irish and Dutch ministers of agriculture and fisheries, under pressure from their domestic 
lobbies, were opposed to this mandate”48. Moreover, the United Kingdom did not want to 
start negotiations until the end of the Doha Round in the WTO. Even within the Commission 
there was disagreement. The project was opposed by the Commissioner of Agriculture, Franz 
                                                          
42Ibid. 
43SeeClarin1/1/2010. 
44Clarin7/3/2010 “Es clave aprovechar la presidencia de España”. 
45El Pais 9/11/2010 “De la Vega intenta que Argentina tome impulse en Mercosur”. 
46Agence Europe 20/5/2010 “Summit sees readjustment of EU-Latin American relations” Europe Daily 
Bulletins. 
47Agence Europe 05/02/2010 “Moratinos says summit with Obama is not urgent –debate with MEPS” Europe 
Daily Bulletins. 
48 See Santander 2005 taken from IRELA 1999. 
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Fishler and his colleagues from France, Commissioners de Silguy and Cresson, and Flynn 
from Ireland49. 
  
At the same time there were other obstacles within the EU against developing an 
economic agreement. These obstacles were based on the Article 24 of the General Agreement 
on trade and tariffs (GATT)50. But Manuel Marin argued that Article 24 of the GATT would 
allow “the progressive liberalization of all sectors establishing exceptions and transitory 
periods for the most sensitive products if it does not pass the 20% of the total [trade]. The 
other obstacle, is the norm of the WTO
51
 that expects the creation of the free trade area in 10 
years maximum”52. Apparently Manuel Marin was able to convince them, since the 
negotiation mandate was eventually conceded. Marin argued that while the exchange of 
agricultural products was only 14% of the trade between both regions, Mercosur was an 
exporter of products such as cereals, meat and lacteous which are all super-sensitive products 
for the EU53. 
 
The negotiations mandate that the EU Council gave to the Commission were 
intentionally linked to the outcome of the WTO negotiations. Therefore, as explained by 
Kutas54, until the end of the negotiations with the WTO, it would be impossible to know the 
real impact of the EU-Mercosur agreement in the agricultural sector. Therefore, this 
uncertainty became an obstacle to the establishment of a trade agreement between the EU and 
Mercosur. In fact, Argentina used this as an excuse not to sign in the last minute. 
 
In relation to the interest groups, two groups were the most proactive - the business 
group and the agriculture group, being in favour and against the agreement respectively. The 
Mercosur European Union Business Forum (MEBF) was created in 1999 to provide an 
informal forum for business people to outline what they consider to be the key issues in the 
trade and industrial relationship between the two regions. This forum was also created to 
develop both a dialogue and policy recommendations with the public authorities in both 
                                                          
49 See Santander 2005. 
50 See El Pais 6/4/1995. 
51
There is an overlapping in the newspapers between the GATT and its substitute, the WTO.  
52SeeEl Pais 6/4/1995. 
53El Pais16/12/ 1995 ”Marin prevé una zona de libre comercio entre la UE y Mercosur en el año 2005”. 
54Kutas, G. (2006) “Still the Agricultural Knot”, in A. Valladão and P. Guerrieri (Eds), EU Mercosur Relations 
and the WTO Doha Round: Common Sectorial Interests and Conflicts, Chaire Mercosur de Sciences-Po, Paris.  
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regions in relation to improving market access, facilitating business relationships and 
encouraging investment55. 
 
  The European farmers tried to protect their products by completely opposed the 
agreement. The Committee of European Agricultural Organization (COPA), the largest 
association of European farmers, complained and opposed the agreement from the very 
beginning. COPA stated that “we are in favour of more liberalized trade but under 
harmonized social and environmental conditions”56. In opposing the agreement, COPA tried 
to put in place some obstacles to developing inter-regional trade by highlighting that EU 
regulation in relation to social and environmental issues did not exist in Mercosur countries. 
It could be argued that because agricultural issues were an important factor explaining why 
an association agreement was not reached during the first round of negotiations attempt is 
evidence of the level of power and influence exerted by these groups within the EU and, 
more specifically, how they were able to influence EU policy towards Mercosur.  
  
During the second round of negotiations there was also support for, as well as 
obstacles to, the establishment of a regional agreement. According to the head of the WTO 
and former European Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, the EU agricultural sector will still be 
protected even with the concessions in the Doha Round and that it is actually the bilateral 
agreements with countries like Brazil what worries European farmers57. Negotiations in the 
agricultural sector remained the biggest obstacle to reaching an association agreement the 
second time around. Although France made some complaints during the first round of 
negotiations, an increasing number of countries complained about the agreement during the 
second round of negotiations. When the last round of negotiations ended in 2004, the EU 
consisted of only 15 member states. By the time of the second round of negotiations, 
membership of the EU now stood at 27, with agricultural sector being pivotal to the national 
economies of most of the new members. Moreover, in comparison to 2004, 2010 saw 
countries such as Greece and Ireland facing more difficult economic circumstances. The 
intensity of complaints increased in weeks before the May Summit of the Head of states of 
the European Union and Latin America that was held in Madrid during the Spanish 
Presidency. The French Minister Bruno Le Maire declared that the EU could not go ahead 
                                                          
55  European Commission Press Release 22/11/1999. 
56Agence Europe 18/6/1996 “Agricultural organizations on both sides intend cooperating despite differences of 
approach on trade issues”.EuropeDailyBulletins 
57SeeAgenceEurope 11/5/2011. 
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with the negotiations due to the negative influence that they would have on agricultural 
sectors in France and in the EU more generally58. In fact, the main farmers trade unions in 
France (FNSA) asked Sarkozy to veto the negotiations altogether59. One of the French 
Minister‟s arguments for opposing the negotiations was the fact that the EU gave concessions 
that would benefit the agricultural sector in Brazil in July 2008 during the negotiations for the 
Doha Round60. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Argentinean newspapers criticised that 
Francereceived more than 20% of the aid given by the EU to the European‟s agricultural 
sector, while Mercosur countries criticised this issue because limited the competitiveness of 
their products61. 
  
Initially, Austria, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland and Poland expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the European Commission‟s 4th of May announcement that they 
would be resuming negotiations62. A few days later, twelve EU ministers for agriculture 
opposed the official re-launching of the negotiations on 17
th
 of May during the Summit of 
Latin America and the EU63. The twelve ministers again cited the concession given in the 
agricultural sector in July 2008, as well as contending that they would “pay twice” the 
consequences of these concessions. Furthermore, this group of ministers also asked the 
European Commission to initiate a study into the effects of this agreement. Le Maire very 
clearly stated that “agriculture is not an exchange currency. We will not go further on the 
negotiations with the WTO. Europe is not an outlet for agricultural products from South 
American countries”64. 
  
Alongside other complaints, there was further dissatisfaction in relation to standards 
of Brazilian products. Furthermore, Irish MEP Marian Harkin, suggested that “the Russians 
and the Americans will not permit the importation of Brazilian beef and have good reasons 
for those decisions”. The EU has been far less demanding in regard to standards and 
traceability of food products. The answer from the European Trade Commissioner De Gutch 
                                                          
58Clarin 6/5/2010 “Francia se opone a las negociaciones entre el Mercosur y la UE”; El Pais 7/5/2010 “Francia 
se opone a desbloquear la negociación con Mercosur”.  
59 See El Pais 7/5/2010. 
60 See Clarin6/5/2010. 
61 Ibid. 
62Agence Europe 15/5/2010 “Seven countries say resumption of Mercosur trade relations is “highly negative 
signal” for European agriculture” Europe Daily Bulletins. 
63Agence Europe 18/5/2010 “Dozen ministers criticise resumption of trade talks with Mercosur” Europe Daily 
Bulletins. 
64Agence Europe 16/09/2010 “Karel De Gucht Hoping for an agreement with Mercosur in 2011” Europe Daily 
Bulletins. 
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to complains was clear: “The Commission does the negotiating, and it has to be respected. 
The French position is well-known-it‟s the same as it always says”65. A few months later, 
the Irish Farmers‟ Association (IFA) accused De Gutch of applying double standards when 
dealing with EU agricultural products imported into the EU. De Gutch was also accused of 
not defending European interests66. Alongside France, Ireland also rejected the negotiations 
with a similar level of intensity. However, Mercosur had a supporter of considerable political 
weight inside the European Union. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, supported the 
agreement and considered the agreement to be beneficial for the Europe as a whole67. 
  
The European Commission certainly supported the second round of 
negotiations.However, in the previous couple of years, neither the EU nor the Mercosur 
showed any real intention of trying to develop an agreement until the Doha Round was 
completed68. As the EU Minister of External Affairs pointed, the Doha Round was going 
nowhere at that point69. Furthermore, the Director of the Area of Latin America for the 
European Commission admitted that both regions needed new markets to help to improve the 
economic situation in response the global economic crisis70. 
  
During the negotiations, the EU accused Mercosur in general, and Argentina in particular, 
of being guilty of hindering the progress towards an agreement. In fact, Commissioner De 
Gutcht directly accused Argentina of causing problems due to their protectionists measures to 
the point where he threatened the Mercosur country with complaining before the WTO
71
. In 
response, Argentina accused De Gutcht of trying to divide Mercosur countries72. However, it 
seems that Paraguay and Brazil were giving a better image of their flexibility for the 
agreement compared to Argentina, although according to the latter, Brazil was just better at 
hiding its strategy73. Other EU actors demonstrate support for the agreement. For example, 
                                                          
65Agence Europe 18/09/2010 “De Gutch replies to Le Maire on Mercosur” Europe Daily Bulletins. 
66Agence Europe 23/02/2011 “Ireland, concerned for its agriculture, raises temperature” Europe Daily 
Bulletins. 
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68Agence Europe 20/05/2008 “Lima Summit obtains mixed results” Europe Daily Bulletins. 
69 See El Pais 25/11/2009. 
70 Ibid. 
71Clarin 15/4/2011 “La UE acusoa Argentina de trabar el comercio”.The European Commissioner was making 
allusions to the barriers to European exporters to Argentina. This issue has been raised by several countries in 
the EU.  
72Ibid. 
73Clarin 5/5/2011 “Otra incierta ronda con la UE por el comercio”. 
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Catherine Asthon, the EU High representative for Foreign Affairs, stated that “negotiations 
with Mercosur must be resumed”74. 
 
 
 
3. MERCOSUR’S INTEREST. 
 
During the first round of negotiations, an important ministerial meeting with the Rio 
Group took place in Luxembourg on 26
th
 and 27
th
 of April 199175. This meeting brought the 
Mercosur countries to Europe. Two days later they visited the European Commission in 
Brussels, meeting President Delors, Vice-Presidents Bangerman, Padonlfi and 
CommissionerMatutes. This indicates Mercosur‟s “willingness to develop relations with the 
Community in particular”76. Under the framework of the annual Rio Group meetings with 
the EU, these meetings helped Mercosur to understand the EU position on many issues, while 
also helping to develop informal meetings in relation to Mercosur interests and projects. 
These meeting produced a desirable outcome in a short period of time. More specifically, 
during a subsequent EU-Rio Group ministerial meeting, the EU and Mercosur signed an 
administrative cooperation agreement. During the time between the 1992 agreement and the 
1995 signature of EMIFCA, Mercosur used different forums such as the annual meetings 
with the Rio Group to ask for an upgrading of EU-Mercosur relations. Particularly this 
“pressures”/”demands” were put on the Spanish commissioner.  
  
Mercosur visibly applied more pressure after the 1995 agreement in an effort to 
release the launching of the negotiations. In fact, in relation to French attitude towards the 
agreement at this stage, JorioDauster, a former Brazilian Ambassador to Brussels, critically 
argued that: „Its [French] attitude is surprising after all this diplomatic work (…) 
Globalization discourse is increasingly false and hypocritical. The rich countries are not 
globalizing because they are not opening their markets, especially agriculture‟s market‟.77In 
                                                          
74Agence Europe 22/4/2010 “Parliament backs conclusion of negotiations with Central America and 
resumption of discussions with Mercosur Europe Daily Bulletins. 
75 EC-RIO GROUP RELATIONSEuropean Commission - MEMO/93/16   22/04/1993 
76Agence Europe23/4/1991 “EEC-Latin America: First Institutionalized ministerial meeting between the EEC 
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77Agence Europe 10/6/1999 “Brazilian diplomat says Latin America should make no concessions if EU does 
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addition to the pressure being mounted by the European Commission and Spain, the pressure 
on the French Embassies in Latin America had some influence [on getting France to 
agree]78. And it was signed a few days later79.  
 
During the second round of negotiations, Mercosur again was in favour of it. 
Argentina and Brazil tried to ignore the problems with each other in order to secure an 
agreement80. There are several reasons for this approach, Argentina would improve its image 
by reaching an international agreement with the EU, while also avoiding that Brazil would 
develop their own relationship with the EU independent of Mercosur81. Uruguay, of course, 
had always supported the agreement82. As a small country, is in bigger needs to have better 
access to other markets including the European market.  
 
In any case, Argentina has always been the Mercosur country with more reservations 
towards establishing an agreement with the EU83.On this occasion, Argentina again created 
obstacles to securing an agreement. Argentina held the presidency of Mercosur at the same 
time that the presidency of the EU was held by Spain. However, this coincidence did not 
create the ideal political moment to reach an agreement because during this period Argentina 
was supposedly blocking imports
84
 from the EU. Countries affected by this issue such as 
Greece, complained directly at European level looking for support within the EU since it 
violated international norms of trade. As consequence, the EU asked Argentina to stop 
blocking the importation of EU goods85. Greece also asked Argentina to explain their 
actions. However, Argentina declined to provide the requested explanation. In the end the 
issues was taken to the WTO level86. Consequently, Greece threatened to block the 
negotiations with Mercosur87. Argentina later offered different reasons to justify the 
                                                          
78SeeElPais 22/6/1999. 
791999/279/EC: Council Decision of 22 March 1999 concerning the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
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81Ibid 
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86 Q&A: EU's challenge to Argentina's import restrictions at the WTOEuropean Commission - MEMO/12/958   
06/12/2012 
87Ibid. 
19 
 
occasional blockings, further claiming during a meeting of the WTO that the European 
accusation had political intentionality88.  
  
Brazil also tried to help with the negotiations. President Lula held a meeting in 
Brasilia with Barroso, the president of the European Commission, and Van Rompouy, the 
president of the European Council89. Brazil had previously been in a similar position as the 
EU with Argentina in relation to their products being blocked in the Argentinean border. 
However, Lula was trying to establish the political conditions required to guarantee 
successful negotiations before leaving the Brazilian presidency90. In fact, when discussing 
his role as president of Mercosur, Lula clearly stated that: “I have assumed the presidency of 
Mercosur and I have the task of trying to persuade the EU to sign an agreement”91. 
Moreover, Lula made allusions to the President of France‟s view on the agreement: “As the 
comrade who has done most (…) is my great friend Nicholas Sarkozy, it will be my 
responsibility to try to convince [him] to win the hearts of the French to get this agreement 
before the end of my presidential term of office”92. However, further diplomatic work by the 
EU and Spain was required in order to get Argentina to tone down its discourse towards 
Europe. In a bid to improve EU-Argentinean relations, the president of Argentina held 
discussions with Barroso during the EU-Latin America Summit in 2008 before holding 
further discussions with the Spanish vice-president in Buenos Aires a year later93. During 
that EU-LA Summit, meeting there was support to continue with EU-Mercosur negotiations 
whenever it was possible94. 
  
Improving the image of Mercosur was another reason to improve relations between 
the EU and Argentina95. The accusation of lack of progress in the integration project came 
from everywhere, including Latin America countries. At the end of 2010, Uruguay claimed 
this was the worst moment for the integration project, suggesting that Mercosur lacked 
political-economic coordination, while other regional projects such as UNASUR were 
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90 Ibid. 
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93 See El Pais 18/4/2010. 
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growing in strength96 (El Pais 10/12/2010). Even Spanish politicians such as Solchaga, the 
former minister of finance, commented on the fragility of the Mercosur project97. However, 
at this moment in time, the most worrying issue for Argentina was the fact that some sectors 
from Brazil wanted an agreement with the EU independent of Mercosur because they 
believedthat Brazil could make further economic advancement without being politically 
bound to the Mercosur project98. 
  
As states earlier, Mercosur clear support and proactive role in developing the 
association agreement fits within the broader literature on EU international agreements where 
third parties actually ask for upgrades and show how proactive as explained by Monar. 
 
 
Current situation of the negotiations 
So far, there has been nine negotiation rounds between the EU and Mercosur99, but 
there is not much progress. In the words of Karel De GuchtEuropean Commissioner for 
Trade: 
“For sure, we have done good work since we resumed the negotiations in 2010. 
However, so far, these negotiations have mainly focussed on the "normative" part of the 
agreement, that is to say the ground rules and principles that should provide the basis for 
commitments between both sides to open up their respective markets. These are very 
important issues, and we have achieved some valuable progress on several chapters, for 
instance on rules of origin and services investment. However, the  negotiations have not yet 
gone into the heart of the matter, namely on the additional  access that we have to give to 
each other's markets for industrial and agricultural  products, services, investment and public 
procurement, through the reduction of tariffs or the dismantling of other barriers”100.  
 
There is a lack of progress in the Doha Round, therefore, bilateral agreements seems 
to be the future for the liberalization process, the increase of trade, and therefore the increase 
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of growth . However, it is difficult to affirm at this point, when the agreement will be 
possible.  The agreement will be possible once there is a real will on both sides, as the EU-
CA agreement has demonstrated. It is clear that both sides would benefit from it. The EU in 
terms of investments on infrastructures in Latin America, and Mercosur on trading 
agricultural products with the EU. 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper has critically reviewed the existing literature attempting to explain the first 
round of negotiations, while also discussing their limited ability in terms of explaining the 
negotiations.  
  
Moreover, this paper has explained how the second round of negotiations includes 
twelve new EU member states with strong agricultural economies and how this made the 
second round of negotiations more difficult. However, the fact that the Doha Round did not 
end successfully, these negotiations seem to have brought both sides closer to reaching an 
agreement. In addition to this, the discussion above has also highlighted the importance of 
Mercosur having to improve their reputation as a regional group after so many concerns had 
been raised in relation to their lack of integration. However, it has been argued that the 
interest shown by both Spain and Portugal, which was evidenced through the Spanish 
presidency, was crucial in terms of re-launching the negotiations.  
  
In comparison to the existing explanations considered above, it has also been argued 
that the Europeanization of mainly Spanish and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese foreign policy 
towards Mercosur has more explanatory power. Necessary as this intense interest from the 
Iberian countries was, it was not sufficient. The critical interest of Mercosur from the very 
beginning helped to both making the negotiations possible and in terms of ensuring that the 
negotiations moved forward. Previous explanations have ignored the importance of political 
“momentum” in terms of the development of these negotiations, especially in relation to the 
influence exerted by Mercosur. Overall, at the time of the second round of negotiations the 
global economic climate and the trade difficulties between some EU countries and Argentina 
22 
 
were obstacles to reaching an association agreement. However, two large regional groups did 
not launch a second round of negotiations if there was not a possibility that both regions 
could achieve a successful agreement similar to agreement that was reached between the EU 
and the Central American Common Market in 2010. 
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